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1 INTRODUCTION 
Unforeseeable changed circumstances are probably one of the 
major problems parties especially those to a long or longer term 
complex contract - may face in international trade. Indeed, with 
globalisation these problems are increased as the involvement of more 
and more countries in production and procurement entail even greater 
imponderabilities. Natural disasters or changes of political and 
economic factors may considerably affect the very basis of the bargain. 
There may be an earthquake, a flood or a civil war in one of the 
production countries, forcing the producer to resort to countries with 
much higher production costs; import or export bans may hinder the 
envisaged flow of the goods; or price fluctuations that were not 
foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract make the 
performance by the seller unduly burdensome or devaluate the contract 
performance for the buyer. 
The paradigm of pacta sunt servanda2 simply places the 
burden of such a change of circumstances upon the party on which it 
Professora Titular de Direito Privado da Universidade da Basileia (Sui9a). 
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falls. However, since the old Roman days the principle of 
impossibilium nulla est obligatio3 has been recognized. Things were 
simple at that time; the slave or the cattle that had been sold had 
perished; or perhaps the crop that should be delivered was destroyed. 
Furthermore, under the doctrine of rebus sie stantibus4 developed by the 
Roman praetor5 an unforeseeable and extraordinary change of 
circumstances rendering a contractual obligation extremely burdensome 
could be recognized. Since these days impossibility, force majeure or 
the like have become grounds for exemption in every legal system 6. 
However, the question whether simple changes of the surrounding 
economic conditions may exempt the debtor from liability under the 
contract has always been a hotly debated issue7 • It is to this very day. 
Let me first start with a short overview of how some select domestic 
legal systems treat this question. 
2 SOME DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS 
The position of French law represents one extreme and it has 
been described many times. Whereas the rule for force majeure is laid 
down in art. 1148 Code Civil (CC), neither general civil nor commercial 
law has been favourable to the concept of hardship 8. The famous theory 
I.e. sanctity ofthe contract. 
I.e. There is no obligation to perform impossible things; Dig. 50.17 .1985. 
The term rebus sie stantibus was mentioned the first time in the early 16th century. In 
1507, Jason de Mayno (1435 - 1519) suggested to use the rebus sie stantibus doctrine 
as a general principle in contract law. For further details on this matter see KÖBLER, 
Ralf. Die "clausula rebus sie stantibus" als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz. Tübingen: J. 
C. B. Mohr, 1991. p. 30 et seq. 
The idea of adapting agreements and promises to an unforeseeable and extraordinary 
change has its roots in roman philosophy with Cicero and Seneca. The doctrine found 
its way into the Canon law in the 14th century, referring to it as rebus sie se 
habentibus. For further details see Köhler, above n. 4, p. 28 et seq. 
See Germany: § 313 Bügerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage); Italy: Artt. 1.467-1.469 Codice Civile (CC) (eccessiva onerosita 
sopravvenuta); France: Art. 1.148 Code Civil (CC) (force majeure). See also 
ZWEIGERT, Konrad; KÖTZ, Hein. Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. 3. ed. 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996. p. 533. 
See ZWEIGERT; KÖTZ, above n. 6, p. 534 et seq. The actual trigger for this 
discussion was the enormous rise in prices due to World War I (1914-1918). 
See KESSEDnAN, Catherine. Competing Approaches to Force Majeure and 
Hardship, 25 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ., p. 415,427, 2005. 
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of imprevision9 that allows a contract to be modified in case of a chan~t 
of circumstances has been applied to administrative contracts only 0 • 
However, the Cour de Cassation has apparently moved · away slightly 
from the strict pacta sunt servanda principle; it appears to be heading in 
the direction of eventually recognizing some kind of hardship 11 . 
Many continental legal systems, however, accept the theory of 
hardship. Among them are Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Austria as well as the Scandinavian countries12. The most recent 
acknowledgement by statute can be found in Germany. The Statute on the 
Modemisation of the Law of Obligations in 2001 finally codified the 
right to have the contract adapted to the changed circumstances in § 313 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) 13 • 
English law seems to reject any notion of relief for changed 
circumstances that do not amount to impossibility14• However, in case of 
frustration of contract - that means where the contract is rendered useless 
9 For details, see Phillippe Stoffel-Munck Regards sur la theorie de l'imprevision: vers 
une souplesse contractuelle en droit prive fran9ais contemporain (Presses universitaire 
d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence, 1994). 
10 See Conseil d'Etat, 30 Mar 1916, D.P.1916, 325; ABAS, Piet. Rebus sie stantibus 
(Cologne: Karl Heymanns, 1993) p. 43. 
11 See MALAURIE, Philippe; A YNES, Laurent. Droit Civil: Les obligations. 3. ed. 
Paris: Juridiques Associees, 2007. p. 379 et seq., stating that the judge still does not 
have the possibility to alter the contract directly on his own unless the parties have 
agreed upon a clause de sauvegarde (hardship clause) or the law itself provides for 
the possibility of the judicial adjustment of the contract. However, the judge is 
allowed to apply the principle of good faith according to Art. 1134(3) CC if there is a 
severe inequity and one party is ofbad faith. See also above KESSEDnAN, 8, (2005) 
25 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ., p. 415,425. 
12 Germany: § 313 BGB (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage); Netherlands: Art. 6:258 
Dutch Civil Code (BW); Italy: Art. 1467 CC (eccessiva onerosita sopravvenuta); 
Greece: Art. 388 Greek Civil Code; Portugal: Art. 437 Portuguese Civil Code; Aus-
tria: §§ 936, 1052, 1170a Austrian BGB through analogy; Scandinavia: see Art. 6: 111 
PECL 1999, Comment note 1, p 328; see also LANDO, Ole. CISG and Its Follo-
wers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles of Contract Law (2005) 53 
Am. J. Comp. L. 379,397. 
13 See UNBERATH, Hannes; BAMBERGER, Heinz Georg; ROTH, Herbert (Eds.). 
Kommmentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. 2. ed., Munich: C. H. Beck, 2007, 
§ 313 BGB, § 2 et seq. For the prerequsites conceming the adaptation to changed 
circumstances, see § 25 et seq. 
14 In Common Law systems, "hardship" seems tobe a mere term describing a fact and 
not a judicial concept. See PERILLO, Joseph. Hardship and its Impact on 
Contractual Obligations: A Comparative Analysis Saggi. Conferenze e Seminari 
#20 (1996), p. 3; PUELINCKX, A. H. Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, 
Imprevision, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Unmöglichkeit, Changed Circumstances, 
3 J. Int'l Arb. 47, 1986. p. 64. 
368 Ingeborg Schwenzer 
by the change of circumstances - an exception is granted to this general 
rule15 • In the United States the Uniform Commercial Code16 has enacted 
the general doctrine of impracticability. The Restatement Second, 
Contracts 2d, reiterates this position 17 • 
3 INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
The Principles on International Commercial Contracts (PICC 
2004)18, the Principles on European Contract Law (PECL 1999)19 as well 
as the Draft of a Common Frame of Reference (DCFR 2008)2° expressly 
provide for rules in cases of a change of circumstances. In 2003 the ICC 
has published its Force Majeure as well as its Hardship Clause as model 
clauses. 
The CISG, however, does not contain a special article dealing 
with questions of hardship. lt does neither mention force majeure nor 
hardship21 . Art. 79 CISG relieves a party from paying damages onli if the 
breach of contract was due to an impediment beyond its control 2• The 
15 See TREITEL, Guenter. Frustration and Force Majeure. 2. ed., London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004. p. 314 et seq. The frustration of purpose doctrine amounts to the 
discharge ofthe contract, see MCKENDRICK, Ewan; GUEST A. G. (Ed.). Chitty on 
Contracts: General Principles. 29. ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, v. I, § 23-
001 et seq. 
16 § 2-615 ucc. 
17 § 261 Restatement Second, Contracts 2d. 
18 See Art. 6.2.3 PICC 2004. 
19 See Art. 6:111 PECL 1999. 
20 See Art. III. - 1: 110 DCFR 2008. 
21 See SCHWENZER, Ingeborg; SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter; SCHWENZER, Ingeborg 
(Eds.). Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN Kaufrecht CISG. 5. ed. Munich: C. H. 
Beck, 2008. Art. 79 § 4; TALLON, Denis; BIANCA, Cesare; BONELL, Michael 
(Eds.). Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Convention. 
Milan: Giuffre, 1987. Art. 79, § 1.3. 
22 See HONNOLD, John. Uniform Law for International Sales. 3. ed. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law, 1999. Art. 79, § 423.4; TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n 
21, Art. 79, § 2.6.2.; ACHILLES, Wilhelm-Albrecht; Kommentar zum UN-
Kaufrechtsübereinkommen (CISG). Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand, 2000. Art. 79, § 3; 
SALGER Hanns-Christian; WITZ, Wolfgang; SALGER, Hanns-Christian; LORENZ, 
Manuel (Eds.). International Einheitliches Kaufrecht: Praktiker-Kommentar und 
Vertragsgestaltung zum CISG. Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft, 2000. Art. 79, § 4; 
BRUNNER, Christoph. Force Majeure and Hardship Under General Contract 
Principles: Exemption of Non-Performance in International Arbitration. Manus, 
p. 157. 
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drafting history of this prov1s10n is not quite clear. During the 
preparations of the CISG the question whether economic difficulties 
should give rise to an exemption was a highly controversial one23 • At the 
Vienna Conference a proposal made by the N orwegian delegation that 
aimed at releasing the debtor from its obligation if after the cessation of a 
temporary impediment there had been a radical change in the underlying 
circumstances was rejected24• Thus, it is quite understandable that during 
the first years after the coming into force of the CISG some scholars 
argued that there was no room to consider hardship under art. 79 CISG25 • 
Today, however, it is more or less unanimous amongst court 
and arbitral decisions26 as well as in scholarly writing27 that art. 79 CISG 
indeed does cover issues relating to hardship. Accordingly, first and 
foremost, there is no room to resort to domestic concepts of hardship28 as 
23 See HONNOLD, John. Documentary History of the Uniform Law for 
International Sales: The studies, deliberations and decisions that led to the 1980 
United Nations Convention with introductions and explanations. Deventer: Kluwer, 
1989. p. 602. See also SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter. Internationales UN-Kaufrecht. 4. 
ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, § 288; BRUNNER, Above n. 22, p 202; 
TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, § 2.6.7. 
24 The Norwegian delegation proposed, that para (3) of Art. 65 of 1978 UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention should be changed in the following way: "[ .. .} Nevertheless, the 
party who fails to perform is permanently exempted to the extent that, after the 
impediment is removed, the circumstances are so radically clianged that it would be 
manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable". (emphasis added). See U.N. DOCU-
MENT A/CONF .97 /C.1/L.191/Rev.1. 
25 See STOLL, Hans; SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter (Ed.). Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Oxford: 1 English Ed., Oxford 
University Press, 1998, Art. 79, § 39. 
26 However, the courts often decided that the equilibrium of the contract was not 
fundamentally altered. Therefore, the alleged impediment was inexistent. See 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Jndustry, 12 Feb 1998, CISG-online 436; 
Rechtbank van Koophandel, Hasselt, 02 May 1995, CISG-online 371; Tribunale 
Civile di Monza, 29 Mar 1993, CISG-online 102; Cour d'Appel de Colmar, 12 Jun 
2001, CISG-online 694. 
27 See CISG AC Opinion n. 7 Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of 
the CJSG (Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro ), 12 Oct 2007, Opinion 3 .1; 
SCHWENZER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79 § 4; 
LINDSTRÖM, Niklas. Changed Circumstances and Hardship in the International Sale 
of Goods. Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, 1, p. 1, 23, 2006; BRUNNER, 
above n. 22, p. 204; SCHLECHTRIEM, above n. 23, § 291. 
28 See HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79 § 425 and para 432.2; TALLON; BIANCA; 
BONELL (Eds.), above n. 21, Art. 79 § 3.1.2.; SCHWENZER; SCHLECHTRIEM; 
SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79 § 12; RIMKE, Joem. Force Majeure and 
Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific Regard to the 
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. Pace 
Int'l L. Rev. eds., p. 197,219, 1999-2000. 
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there is no gap in the CISG regarding the debtor' s invocation of 
economic impossibility and the adaptation of the contract to changed 
circumstances. If one were to hold otherwise unification of the law of 
sales would be undermined in a very important area. Domestic concepts 
such as frustration of purpose, rebus sie stantibus, fundamental mistake, 
Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage would all have to be considered. 
However, which cases of hardship amount to an impediment 
under art. 79 CISG and what remedies the aggrieved party may resort to 
is still a matter of dispute. 
4 PREREQUISITES FOR FORCE MAJEURE AND 
HARDSHIP UNDER THE CISG 
4.1 General 
Art. 79(1) CISG provides that a party is exempted from liability 
for damages only, if the failure to perform is due (1) to an impediment 
beyond its control and (2) that it could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or (3) to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences29. Art. 
7.1.7(1) PICC 2004, art. 8:808(1) PECL 1999, as well as art. III. - 3:104(1) 
DCFR 2008 are practically identical to art. 79(1) CISG. Tue same holds 
true for the ICC Force Majeure Clause. However, the latter gives a list of 
events that may amount to an impediment, such as war, natural disasters, 
explosions, strikes, acts of authority etc. Thus, conceming the force 
majeure issue there are three clearly distinct prerequisites; the impediment 
must not fall in the sphere of risk of the obligor; it must have been 
unforeseeable; and it or its consequences must have been unavoidable30• 
As far as the provisions regarding hardship are concerned, again 
the international solutions bear great resemblance to one another31 . In the 
29 See STOLL, Hans; GRUBER, Georg; SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter; SCHWENZER, 
Ingeborg (Eds.). Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods. Oxford: 2 English ed, Oxford University Press, 2005. Art. 79, § 10 et seq.; 
MANKOWSKI, Peter; SCHMIDT, Karsten (Eds.). Münchener Kommentar zum 
Handelsgesetzbuch. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2004. Art. 79 CISG, § 34 et seq.; 
SCHLECHTRIEM, above n. 23, § 289. 
30 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 79, 
§ 10 et seq.; TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, § 2.6.1. et seq.; 
HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79, § 423.4; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 102. 
31 See above III. 
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first place the relevant articles and clauses emphasize the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda32. Tue mere fact that performance has been rendered 
more onerous than could reasonably have been anticipated at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract does not exempt the obligor from 
performing the contract33 • Hardship can only be found if the performance 
of the contract has become excessively onerous34, or in other words if the 
equilibrium of the contract has been fundamentally altered35• Again, as in 
the force majeure provisions, the event in question must not fall in the 
sphere of risk of the aggrieved party; it must have been unforeseeable as 
well as unavoidable. Thus, hardship can be considered as a special group 
of cases under the general force majeure provisions. All that is added to 
the force majeure provisions on the level of prerequisites is a clarification 
of the term impediment in cases where performance in the strict sense is 
possible but just too onerous. This may justify dealing with hardship 
under the CISG as well as under the other international harmonization 
projects in a consolidated manner. 
4.2 Relevant threshold for hardship 
The crucial point in the first place is to determine the threshold 
of hardship. When has performance become excessively onerous? When 
has the equilibrium of the contract been fundamentally altered? Thereby 
either an increase in cost of performance or a decrease in value of the 
32 Art. 6.2.1 PICC 2004; Art. 6:111(1) PECL 1999; Art. III. - 1:110 DCFR 2008; ICC 
Hardship Clause 2003, § 1.; see also RlMKE, above n. 28, p. 197,237. 
33 See SCHWENZER in SCHLECHTRIEM and SCHWENZER (Eds ), above n. 21, Art. 
79, § 14; see also RlMKE, above n. 28, p. 197, 200; SCHLECHTRIEM, above n. 23, 
§ 291. 
34 Art. 6:111(2) PECL 1999; Art. III. - 1:110(2) DCFR 2008; ICC Hardship Clause 
2003 para. 2(a). See also SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter. Uniform Sales Law: The UN-
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Vienna: Manz, 1986. p 102; 
MAGNUS, Ulrich. J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 
mit Einführungsgesetzen und Nebengesetzen, Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). 15. 
ed. Berlin: Sellier, 2006, Art. 79, § 4; MASKOW, Dietrich; ENDERLEIN, Fritz; 
MASKOW, Dietrich; STROHBACH, Heinz (Eds.). Internationales Kaufrecht. 
Berlin: Haufe, 1991, Art. 79, § 6.3; PERILLO, Joseph. Force Majeure and Hardship 
Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 5 Tul. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L., p. 1, 9, 1996; BUND, Jennifer. Force Majeure Clauses: Drafting 
Advice for the CJSG Practicioner. 17 J.L. & Com., p. 381, 389, 1998; AUDIT, 
Bemard. La vente internationale de marchandises, Convention des Nations-Unies 
du 11 avril 1980. Paris: L. G. D. J., 1990. p. 174; HEUZE, Vincent. La vente 
internationale de marchandises, Droit uniforme. (Paris: L. G. D. J., 2000. P. 425. 
35 Art. 6.2.2 PICC 2004. 
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performance received may be relevant36• This means that the aggrieved 
party can be either the seller or the buyer. 
The starting point has to be the contract itself. Primarily it is uf 
to the parties to define their respective spheres of risk in the contract3 . 
One party may have expressly or impliedly assumed the risk for a 
fundamental change of circumstances or - on the contrary - certain risks 
may have been expressly or impliedly excluded38. This determination can 
be done by mere contract interpretation. 
If for example the contract is highly speculative, the obligor can 
be presumed to have assumed the risk involved in the transaction39 • Thus 
a German court of second instance 40 did not exempt a seller from liability 
under art. 79 CISG although the market price for the contract item, iron 
molybdenum from China, had risen by 300%. The court reasoned that in 
a trade sector with highly speculative traits the threshold for allowing 
hardship should be raised. As such, typical fluctuations of price in the 
commodity trade generally will not give rise to an acknowledgement of 
hardship 41 • 
lt is questionable how the relevant threshold for giving rise to a 
hardship excuse is determined if no such special circumstances exist. 
Whereas the Comment to art. 6.2.2 PICC42 in its first edition of 1994 
suggested that an alteration amounting to 50% or more would be likely to 
amount to a "fundamental" alteration, the second edition of the PICC in 
2004 refrains from recommending any exact figure. 
36 See BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 207 et seq. 
37 See Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 Feb 1998, CISG-online 436; 
KATZ, Avery. Remediesfor Breach ofContract under the CISG. 25 Int'l Rev. L. & 
Econ., p. 378, 381, 2006. lt is also held that the risk allocation is dependant on the 
parties' choice of law at first, see OBERMAN, Neil. Transfer of risk from seller to 
buyer in international commercial contracts: A comparative analysis of risk 
allocation under the CISG, UCC and Incoterms July 1997, available online at 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/thesis/Oberman.html>. Last accessed on: 16 Jul 
2008. 
38 See BRUNNER, above n. 22, p 136 et seq.; TREITEL, above n. 15, p 455 et seq.; 
KATZ, above n. 37, 25 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ., p. 378, 391, 2006; CISG AC Opinion 
n. 7, above n. 27, Comment, § 39. 
39 BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 206; ICC Award, 26 Aug 1989, 6281, CISG-online 8; 
Rechtbank van Koophandel, Tongeren, 25 Jan 2005, CISG-online 1106. 
40 See Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 Feb 1997, CISG-online 261. 
41 See LEISINGER, Benjamin. Fundamental Breach Considering Non-Conformity 
of the Goods. Munich: Sellier, 2007. p. 119. 
42 Comment 2. 
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Certainly, in ascertaining whether any alteration amounts to 
hardship primary consideration is to be given to the circumstances of the 
individual case. Thus it may be relevant whether we are dealing with a 
short term sales contract or a long term instalment contract43 . The profit 
margin in the respective trade sector may also play an important role. 
Finally, in cases where the financial ruin of the obligor is impending the 
threshold for allowing hardship may be lowered44. 
However, legal certainty clearly calls for some benchmark. 
Relying on a thorough comparative analysis of domestic solutions one 
author45 has suggested that as a general rule of thumb in standard 
situations a threshold of 100% should be favoured. However, courts 
interpreting art. 79(1) CISG have been very reluctant to allow hardship in 
case of fluctuations of prices46. Up to now, there is no single reported 
court or arbitral decision exempting a party - neither a seller nor a buyer 
from liability under a CISG sales contract due to hardship. All decisions 
dealing with hardship under art. 79 CISG concluded that even a price 
increase or decrease of more than 100% would not suffice47 • The 
suggested "100% threshold" seems to be based upon considerations of 
domestic markets where price fluctuations are not to be expected to the 
same degree as in international markets. In an international market one 
may expect the potentially aggrieved party that it insists on incorporating 
terms for a possible adjustment in the contract or otherwise assumes the 
risk for higher fluctuations than they usually occur on domestic markets. 
Thus the margin certainly has to be set at a higher point. A 150-200% 
margin seems to be advisable. 
43 BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 405 et seq. 
44 BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 406. 
45 BRUNNER, Christoph. UN-Kaufrecht - CISG, Kommentar zum Übereinkommen 
der Vereinten Nationen über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf von 1980, 
unter Berücksichtigung der Schnittstellen zum internen Schweizer Recht. Bern: 
Stämpfli, 2004, Art. 79 CISG, § 26; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 396. 
46 See ICC Award, 26 Aug 1989, n. 6281, CISG-online 8; Tribunale di Monza, 14 Jan 
1993, CISG-online 540; LOOKOVSKY, Joseph. Impediments and Hardship in 
International Sales: A Commentary on Catherine Kessedjian's "Competing 
Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship". 25 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ., p. 434, 438, 
2005. 
47 lt is argued that an increased price is foreseeable for a company acting in international 
trade, see CIETAC, 10 May 1996, CISG-online 1067; Bulgarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 12 Feb 1998, CISG-online 436; Rechtbank van Koophandel, 
Hasselt, 23 Feb 1994. CISG-online 371; Cour d'Appel de Colmar, 12 Jun 2001, 
CISG-online 694; Cour de Cassation, 30 Jun 2004, CISG-online 870. 
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4.3 Time factor 
In cases of force majeure it is more or less unanimously held 
that it is irrelevant whether the impediment arose after the conclusion of 
the contract or if it already existed at the time of conclusion 48 • Thus if the 
goods sold had already been destroyed at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract but the seller did not know about nor could have prevented this 
fact the seller may be exempted under art. 79(1) CISG49• 
In cases of hardship, however, it is argued that the change of 
circumstances must have occurred after the conclusion of the contract50• 
This is the position taken by domestic legal systems51 . Similarly, the 
wording of art. 6:111(1) PECL 199952 is clearly based upon this 
assumption. The respective Comment affirms this position53 . However, 
although the wording of art. 6.2.1 PICC 200454 seems to point in the same 
direction, art. 6.2.)(a) PICC 2004 clarifies that hardship may be found if 
either the events that are causing the imbalance of the performances occur 
or if they become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion 
of the contract55 • 
To the date, neither case law nor scholarly writing have up to 
now discussed the relevant time factor under the CISG - assuming one 
accepts hardship as being covered by art. 79 CISG. In order to decide 
whether an initial gross imbalance between the performances of the 
48 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 12; HERBER, Rolf; CZERWENKA, Beate. Internationales Kaufrecht, 
Kommentar zu dem Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 
über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1991, 
Art. 79, § 11; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods prepared by the Secretariat (U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 97/5), O.R. p 14, 
Art. 65, § 4; NEUMA YER, Karl; MING, Catherine. Convention de Vienne sur les 
contrats de vente internationale de merchandise, commentaire. Lausanne: 
CEDIDAC, 1993, Art. 79, § 6; disapproving TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). 
above n. 21, Art. 79 note 2.4.3. 
49 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 12; CISG AC Opinion n. 7, above nn 27, Comment § 8. 
50 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 12; Comment n. 3.a on Art. 6.2.2. PICC 2004; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 369. 
51 See § 313(1) BGB: "Haben sich die Umstände [ ... ] nach Vertragsschluss 
schwerwiegend verändert [ ... ]" ( emphasis added). 
52 
"[. . .] if performance has become more onerous [. . .]" ( emphasis added); see also Art. 
III. - 1: 110(2) DCFR 2008. 
53 See Art. 6: 111 PECL 1999 Comment B. (ii). 
54 
"Where the performance [ ... ] becomes more onerous [ ... ]" (emphasis added). 
55 The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 seems tobe open for interpretation. 
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parties due to circumstances neither known to the parties nor preventable 
may amount to hardship under art. 79 CISG one has to consider what 
other remedies the aggrieved party could rely on when discovering that 
already at the time of the conclusion of the contract there has been a gross 
disparity between the respective values of the agreed upon performances. 
Most likely under domestic laws as well as under PECL 1999 initial gross 
disparity between the performances will give rise to remedies for 
mistake56• These coexisting remedies may be tolerable within one single 
legal system; difficult problems, however, can arise when dealing with 
sales contracts under the CISG57. As the CISG does not contain any 
provisions on mistake this question would have to be resolved relying on 
the otherwise applicable domestic law58. However, this may well lead to 
unpredictable results. F or example, it might be questionable at what point 
in time production costs have risen, be it before the conclusion of the 
contract or only afterwards. Furthermore, uniformity in such an important 
area of sales law would be endangered by applying domestic rules on 
mistake to this question. lt is exactly these considerations that in the case 
of force majeure compel an equal treatment of initial and subsequent 
impediments. Thus if the goods have been destroyed at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, domestic rules declaring such a contract as 
being void are excluded59. Nothing else, however, can apply in cases of 
hardship. Thus the very term of hardship under the CISG should be 
interpreted and understood in the broadest sense; encompassing both any 
change of circumstances after the conclusion of the contract as well as a 
gross disparity of the value of performances already existing at the time 
of conclusion of the contract. 
56 See Art. 6: 111 PECL 1999 Comment B. (ii); Netherlands: ROSSUM, M. Van; 
BUSCH, Danny et al. (Eds. ). The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch 
Law. The Hague Kluwer Law, 2002. p 193; USA: § 266 Restatement (2d) of 
Contracts ("Existing lmpracticability or Frustation"). 
57 See LEYENS, Patrick. CISG and Mistake: Uniform Law vs. Domestic Law: The 
Interpretative Challenge of Mistake and the Validity Loophole. Pace Int'l L. Rev. 
eds., p. 3, 15, 2003-2004. 
58 lt is held that a party can rely on mistake where the CISG and the domestic law provide 
the same remedies. Fora detailed discussion about this matter see LEYENS, above n. 
57. Pace Int'l L. Rev. eds., p 3, 34, 2003-2004; KRÖLL, Stefan. Selected Problems 
Conceming the CISG's Scope of Application, 25 J.L. & Com., p. 39, 55, 2005. 
59 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 12; NICHOLAS; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 68, § 3.1; 
MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 4, § 44 and Art. 79, § 33; SIEHR, Kurt; 
HONSELL, Heinrich (Ed.). Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht. Berlin: Springer, 
1997, Art. 4, §§ 5 and 15; BRUNNER, above n 45, Art. 4, § 9; MASKOW; 
ENDERLEIN; MASKOW; STROHBACH (Eds.). above n. 34, Art. 79, § 5.2; but see 
TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, § 2.4.3. 
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4.4 Events that could not reasonably be taken into 
account or avoided or overcome 
Force majeure as well as hardship can only exempt the 
aggrieved party from liability if the events causing the impediment 
could not reasonably be taken into account by the aggrieved party at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract60 • If they could have been taken 
into account by the aggrieved party then it can be expected that this 
party would insist on incorporating a specific contract clause to deal 
with the problem. Thus this party must be assumed to have taken the 
risk61 • 
Furthermore, even an impediment that the aggrieved party could 
not foresee at the time of the conclusion of the contract does not exempt it 
if overcoming the impediment is both possible and reasonable62 . Whether 
the obligor can be expected to overcome the impediment has to be decided 
by taking the above mentioned threshold for hardship into account63 • Thus, 
for example, the seller must turn to another supplier or consider alternative 
possibilities for the transportation of the goods if the increase in costs does 
not exceed the relevant threshold. 
5 CONSEQUENCES OF FORCE MAJEURE AND 
HARDSHIP 
5.1 Exemption from liability 
If the non-performance is due to an impediment that fulfils the 
conditions set forth in art. 79(1) CISG or the comparable provisions64 
first and foremost the obligor is relieved from its obligation to pay 
60 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 22; TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, § 2.6.3.; 
SALGER; WITZ, SALGER; LORENZ (Eds.). above n. 22, Art. 79, § 5; MAGNUS; 
STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 79, § 32. 
61 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79 § 22; AUDIT, above n. 34, p. 174; TALLON; BIANCA; BONELL (Eds.). above 
n. 21, Art. 79, § 2.6.3.; NEUMAYER; MING, above n. 48, Art. 79, § 4. 
62 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 23; HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79, § 432.1; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 298; 
MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 79, § 34. 
63 See above IV. 2. 
64 See Art. 7.1.1 PICC 2004; Art. 8:108 PECL 1999; Art. III. -3:104 DCFR 2008. 
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damages65 . This includes so-called "liquidated damages"66 as well as 
penalties (if they are at all valid under the governing domestic law), 
unless the parties have provided otherwise in their contract67. 
Art. 8:101(2) PECL 1999 clearly states that where a party's 
non-performance is excused alongside with the right to claim damages 
the right to performance is likewise excluded 68 . Whether the 
exemption under art. 79 CISG also extends to the promisee's right of 
performance has been a subject of considerable debate69 because of the 
somewhat misleading wording of art. 79(5) CISG70 • A German 
proposal that the wording should make clear that if the impediment 
were a continuing one performance could not be insisted on was 
rejected at the Vienna Conference. lt was held that, in the case of 
actual impossibility, no problems would arise in practise whereas the 
categorical removal of the right to performance could impair the 
promisee' s accessory rights 71 • Although especially among German 
authors there still remain doubts about the dogmatic justification 72 
65 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 43; MASKOW; ENDERLEIN; MASKOW; STROHBACH (Eds.). above n. 
34, note 4 to part IV: BEFREIUNGEN; HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79, 
§ 423.4; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 320. 
66 See MCKENDRICK, Ewan; GUEST, A.G. (Ed.). Chitty on Contracts, above n. 56, 
§ 26-010; CALAMARI, John; PERILLO, Joseph. The Law of Contracts. 5. ed. St. 
Paul: Thomson West, 2003. p. 611 et seq.; BRIDGE, Michael. The International 
Sale of Goods, Law and Practice. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, § 
10.44. 
67 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
74, § 48 et seq.; ICC Award, 1992, n. 7585, CISG-online 105. 
68 See also FLAMBOURAS, Dionysios. Comparative Remarks on CISG Article 79 
& PECL Articles 6:111, 8:108, January 2007 <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ 
text/peclcomp79.html>. Last accessed: 10 Jul 2008). 
69 See STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
79, § 43; HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79, § 495.2; BUND, above n. 34, (1998) 17 
JL & Com 381,388; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 320; BRIDGE, above n. 66, § 12.61; 
HEUZE, above n. 34, p. 430. 
70 
"Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to 
claim damages under this Convention". 
71 See United Nations ( ed) UN Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Vienna, 10 March - 11 April 1980, Official Records, Documents of the 
Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the 
Main Committees, New York (1981) (UN DOC. A/CONF. 97/19), p. 381 et seq.; 
SCHWENZER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, § 52; 
but see BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 336. 
72 See MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 79 para 58; MANKOWSKI; 
SCHMIDT (Ed.). above n. 29, Art. 79, § 8; HUBER, Peter; REBMANN, Kurt et al. 
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nowadays it seems to be undisputed that wherever the right to claim 
performance would undermine the obligor' s exemption performance 
cannot be demanded as long as the impediment exists 73 • This rule not 
only applies for example to cases of actual impossibility of 
performance but also to cases of hardship. 
5.2 Right of avoidance 
Among the rights that are not affected by an exemption is first 
and foremost the right to avoid the contract74• However, this right 
presupposes that the non-performance amounts to a fundamental breach 
of contract. Whether such a fundamental breach exists largely depends 
upon the circumstances of the individual case 75 . 
Art. 25 CISG- and likewise art. 7.3.1(2) PICC 2004, art. 8:103 
PECL 1999 and art. III. - 3:502(2) DCFR 2008 - circumscribe a 
fundamental breach of contract as one that results in such detriment to the 
other party as substantially to deprive it of what it is entitled to expect 
under the contract. One of the central questions thereby is whether it is 
possible and - having regard to the other party' s expectations - just and 
reasonable that the breach be remedied76• We will return to this question 
during the following discussions. 
(Eds.). Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. 5. ed. Munich: C. 
H. Beck, 2008, Art. 79, § 29; SALGER; WITZ; SALGER; LORENZ (Eds.). above n. 
22, Art. 79, § 12; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 321. 
73 See SCHWENZER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 21, Art. 79, 
§§ 53 and 54; MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 79, §§ 59 and 60; 
ACHILLES, above n. 22, Art. 79, § 14. See also HONNOLD, above n. 22, Art. 79, § 
435.5. 
74 See Art. 79(5) CISG; STOLL; GRUBER; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). 
above n. 29, Art. 79 para 4.; BRUNNER, above n. 22, p 340; Honnold, above n. 22, 
Art. 79, § 435.l; ACHILLES, above n. 22, Art. 79 para 14; RIMKE, above n. 28, p 
197,217; MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n. 34, Art. 79, § 55. 
75 See SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHLECHTRIEM; SCHWENZER (Eds.). above n. 29, Art. 
25, § 5 "[. . .] any abstract definition [of the fundamental breach] must expect criti-
cism [. . .]"; Magnus in Staudinger, above n 46, Art. 25 para 3; Brunner, above n 45, 
Art. 25, § 8; Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 12 Mar 2001, CISG-online 841; CIETAC, 
30 Oct 1991, CISG-online 842. 
76 See CISG AC Opinion n. 5 The buyer 's right to avoid the contract in case of the non-
coriforming goods or documents (Rapporteur: Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer), 7 May 
2005, Opinion 3. 
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5.3 The obligation to renegotiate in cases of hardship 
In true cases ofhardship art. 6.2.3(1) PICC 2004, art. 6:111(2) 
PECL 1999 as well as art. III. - 1 : 110(3 )( d) DCFR firstly state an 
obligation to renegotiate. The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 likewise 
provides that the parties are bound to negotiate alternative contractual 
terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the changed 
circumstances within a reasonable time of the invocation of the Clause 77 • 
This duty to renegotiate is seen to be based on a general duty to act in 
good faith78 which is common to many Civil Law systems79 • 
Other legal systems do not know such a duty to renegotiate. 
This is not only true for Common Law systems even where they 
recognize the general principle of hardship or impracticability as Sec. 2-
615 UCC,80 but also some Civil Law systems such as Germany where 
under the newly enacted § 313 BGB the parties are not bound to 
renegotiate either81 . Although there are some authors favouring such a 
duty to renegotiate under German law82, the prevailing view follows the 
clear wording of the provision that does not mention any such duty but 
instead allows a party to immediately resort to the court asking for an 
77 See ICC Hardship Clause 2003 para (2)(b ). 
78 See BRUNNER, above n 22, p 445; MAGNUS; STAUDINGER, above n 34, Art. 79 
para 24; BRUNNER, above n 45, Art. 79, § 24. 
79 The principle of good faith found its way into almost every Civil Law system due to 
the reception of Roman law. See France: Art. 1148 CC; ltaly: Art. 1337 CC; 
Germany: § 242 BGB; Switzerland: Art. 2 ZGB. Common Law systems however tend 
to refrain from accepting good faith as a general principle of contract law, see 
BRIDGE, Michael. Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith? 
Can Bus LJ 412, 426, 9, 1984; FARNSWORTH, Allan. Duties of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing under the Unidroit Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and 
National Laws. 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47, 51 et seq., 1995. 
80 Sec. 2-615 (a) UCC states that "[d]elay in delivery or non-delivery [ ... ] is not a 
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency [ ... ]". Fora detailed discussion of 
the impracticability doctrine in American law, see TREITEL, above n. 15, § 6-001 et 
seq. 
81 See § 313 BGB which does not mention a duty to renegotiate the contract. 
82 See GRÜNEBERG, Christian; PALANDT, Otto et al. (Eds.). Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
67. ed, Munich, 2008, § 313, BGB, § 41; HEINRICHS, Helmut. Vetragsanpassung 
bei Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage: Eine Skizze der Anspruchslösung des § 313 
BGB. In: LORENZ, Stephan et al. (Eds.). Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 70. 
Geburtstag. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005. p 183, 195; RIESENHUBER, Karl. 
Vertragsanpassung wegen Geschäftsgrundlagenstörung - Dogmatik, Gestaltung 
und Vergleich. Betriebs-Berater 2004, 59, 2697, 2698. 
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adaptation of the contract83 . Likewise, neither the Italian nor the Dutch 
Code provisions on hardship84 oblige the parties to renegotiate. 
Art. 79(5) CISG - as has already been pointed out85 - expressly 
relieves the aggrieved party from damages only. Some authors, however, 
advocate the idea that also under the CISG there is a duty to renegotiate 
based upon art. 7(1) CISG according to which the Convention has tobe 
interpreted with regard to the observance of good faith in international 
trade86. lt has been questioned many times whether art. 7(1) CISG may be 
applied not only in interpreting the Convention as such but may also be 
used to establish the principle of dealing in good faith among the 
parties87 . Without having to decide this dispute the question of any duty 
to renegotiate can be answered in the negative. 
In the first place renegotiation as negotiation has to be based on 
voluntariness and trust. Constructive and cooperative renegotiation 
cannot be forced upon the parties by coercion 88 . 
Furthermore, lacking any means of specific enforcement the 
duty to renegotiate amounts to nothing more than a farce. The duty to 
negotiate would gain importance only if breaching it were sanctioned. 
lndeed, this is envisaged by art. 6:111(3)(c) PECL 1999. Accordingly, the 
court may award damages for the loss suffered through a party refusing to 
negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair 
dealing. However, it is certainly not advisable to state such a liability in 
83 See SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter. The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations 
in the Contest of Common Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in 
Europe Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 2, 2002, available online at 
<http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/schlechtriem2.shtml> (last accessed on 22 Jul. 
2008); UNBERATH; BAMBERGER; ROTH (Eds.). above n. 13, § 313 § 85; Barbara 
Dauner-Lieb and Wolfgang Dötsch Prozessuale Fragen rund um§ 313 BGB (2003) 
NJW 921,922. 
84 See Artt. 1467-1469 Italian CC (onerosita) and Artt. 6:258 and 6:260 Dutch BW; Art. 
451 ofthe Civil Code ofthe Russian Federation. See also BERGER, Klaus. Renegoti-
oation and Adaptation of international Investment Contracts: The Role ofthe Contract 
Drafters and Arbitrators, () 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L., p. 1347, 1356, 2003. For 
further references, see BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 445. 
85 See above V. 1. 
86 CISG AC Opinion n. 7, above n. 27, Comment para 40; JCC Award, Mar 1999, n. 
5953, Clunet 1990, 1056 et seq. 
87 See Schlechtriem in Schlechtriem and Schwenzer (eds), above n 29, Art. 7 para 7; 
Farnsworth, above n 79, 1995, 3 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47, 56. 
88 See ROTH, Günter; KRÜGER, Wolfgang (Ed.). Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. 5. Ed. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2007, § 313 BGB, § 93; 
DAUNER-LIEB andDÖTSCH, above n. 83, 2003, NJW 921,925. 
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damages. Cases of hardship involve such complex fact situations and 
evaluations that it can hardly be determined whether a party refusing or 
breaking off negotiations acted in bad faith. In addition, international 
trade regularly calls for promptness and legal certainty which in itself 
militates against lengthy negotiations. Clear cases of bad faith may be 
taken into account upon allocating the costs of proceedings89. 
To sum up; in cases ofhardship a duty to renegotiate should not 
be advocated. This, however, does not preclude that an offer by one party 
to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances becomes relevant 
when dealing with the possible respective remedies of the parties. 
5.4 Adaptation of the contract and avoidance 
Under some legal systems of the civil law tradition in cases of 
hardship the court is primarily called upon to adapt the contract to the 
changed circumstances90• Avoidance is allowed only as a remedy of last 
resort if an adaptation of the contractual terms is either not possible or not 
just and reasonable having regard to the respective interests of the 
parties91 • Art. 6.2.3(4) PICC 2004, art. 6:111(3) PECL 1999, as well as 
art. III. - 1: 110(2)(b) DCFR 2008 also follow this approach. On the other 
hand, art. 1467 Italian Codice Civile as well as the ICC Hardship Clause 
2003 take a different stand; the party invoking hardship is entitled to an 
avoidance of the contract, an adaptation of the contract is not 
contemplated92. 
If one recognizes hardship as an impediment under art. 79 CISG 
it is questionable whether an adaptation of the contract is possible93 . lt 
can hardly be conceived that there is a gap in the CISG that can be filled 
by giving the court or tribunal the power to adapt the contract to the 
changed circumstances. Therefore, it has been proposed to rely on art. 
6.2.3( 4) PICC 2004 as constituting an international usage in the sense of 
art. 9(2) CISG in order to reach the desirable result of adaptation94 . This 
dogmatic method does not seem to be necessary, however. The usual 
89 See BRUNNER, above n. 22, p. 448. 
90 See§ 313(1) BGB; SWITZERLAND: Swiss Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) 
on clausula rebus sie stantibus, BGE 107 II 343,348. 
91 See e.g. § 313(3) BGB. 
92 The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 states in para 3 that: "[ ... ] the party invoking this 
Clause is entitled to termination of the contract". 
93 But see CISG AC Opinion N. 7, above n. 27, Comment § 40. 
94 See Peter SCHLECHTRIEM, above n. 23, § 291. 
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remedy mechanism under the CISG in combination with the duty to 
mitigate as a general principle95 may yield satisfying and flexible results 
in practice. This may be demonstrated by the following hypothetical. 
Suppose in a given case the acquisition costs for the seller have 
tripled thus giving rise to a plea of hardship. Upon the seller informing 
the buyer that it is not able to perform the contract because of this event, 
there appear two possible scenarios. 
Scenario 1: The seller suggests delivering the goods if the buyer 
is willing to pay a higher purchase price. If the buyer consents the 
contract is accordingly adapted. If the buyer does not consent and the 
seller repudiates the contract - based on its original terms - on the ground 
of hardship the buyer in turn will sue the seller for specific performance 
or - most probably - for damages. The court or tribunal will then find 
that the seller is released from its obligations due to hardship. If the seller 
wants to go through with the contract - albeit on different terms - it will 
initiate a counter claim seeking at performance or damages for wrongful 
repudiation on the part of the buyer. The buyer will then rely on 
avoidance because of fundamental breach. Now the court or tribunal has 
to decide whether the fact that the seller was willing to deliver the goods 
but on different terms amounted to a fundamental breach of contract 
giving the buyer the right to avoid the contract. lt hereby considers 
whether it would have been just and reasonable for the buyer in the 
circumstances of the given case to accept the different terms offered by 
the seller. If it finds that the buyer should have consented to an adaptation 
on the basis of good faith it will find for the seller. 
Scenario 2: The buyer offers to pay a higher price whereas the 
seller wants to get out of the contract. Under these circumstances again, 
probably the buyer will claim either specific performance or damages for 
a cover purchase. The court or tribunal now has to determine whether 
having regard to the different contract terms offered by the buyer 
hardship can still be held to exist. If not, the seller is neither released 
from its obligation to perform nor to pay damages. 
95 See SCHWENZER, Ingeborg; MANNER, Simon. The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: 
The Impact of the Non-Breaching Party's (Non-) Behaviour on its CISG-Remedies. 
In: ANDERSEN, Camilla; SCHROETER, Ulrich (Eds.). Sharing International 
Commercial Law Across National Boundaries. Festschrift for Albert H Kritzer. 
London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2008. p. 470,480. 
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Thus in both scenarios results can be reached similar to those 
legal systems that expressly provide for the power of the court or tribunal 
to adapt the contract to the changed conditions. Although there is no 
explicit duty to renegotiate under the CISG there certainly is a duty to 
mitigate damages according to art. 77 CISG. This duty to mitigate may 
well require the aggrieved party to strike a deal even with the contract 
breaching party and - a fortiori - in cases where unforeseen 
circumstances make performance excessively onerous for one party96 . 
Although this mechanism seems to be especially warranted in 
cases of hardship it might also come into play in cases of other 
impediments in the sense of art. 79 CISG. Thus where the seller has sold 
specific goods that were destroyed after the formation of the contract it 
may well be the case that substitute goods exist serving the buyer's 
interests just as well as the original ones. If the seller offers these goods 
as "eure" the buyer may well be obliged to accept them as no 
fundamental breach of contract can be ascertained in this case. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Whereas many systems - especially in recent times PICC 2004, 
PECL 1999 and DCFR 2008 - clearly distinguish betweenforce majeure 
and hardship under the CISG both situations have to be dealt with under 
the same provision, namely art. 79 CISG. And rightly so. All too often 
drawing the line betweenforce majeure and hardship is not possible. The 
days of the old Roman notion of "impossibility" are gone; most 
subsequent events do not render performance impossible and thus do not 
constitute a veritable impediment in the sense of art. 79 CISG, they just 
render performance more or less onerous for the obligor. Thus it seems 
preferable to deal with both situations under the same heading with the 
same prerequisites and the same consequences. 
lt has been shown that under the remedies mechanism of the 
CISG there is enough flexibility to reach just and equitable results that on 
the one hand guarantee legal certainty and that on the other hand 
contribute to implement good faith and fair dealing in international sales 
law. Thus the very scarcity of the CISG on questions of hardship 
facilitates solutions that are well adjusted to the everyday needs of 
globalized international trade. 
96 See SCHWENZER; MANNER, above n. 95, p. 470,486 et seq. 
